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ABSTRACT
We analyze the central economic issues raised by U.S. v Microsoft. Network effects and
economies of scale in applications programs created a barrier to entry for new operating system
competitors, which the combination of Netscape Navigator and the Java programming language
potentially could have lowered.  Microsoft took actions to eliminate this threat to its operating
system monopoly, and some of Microsoft’s conduct very likely harmed consumers.  While we
recognize the risks of the government’s proposed structural remedy of splitting Microsoft in two,
we are pessimistic that a limited conduct remedy would be effective in this case.3
While most antitrust cases proceed in obscurity, the case brought against Microsoft by
U.S. and State antitrust authorities was front-page news.  Much of the drama and media hype
centered on the struggle between the titan of high technology, personified in Bill Gates, and the
titan of government, personified in U.S. Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein.  For economists
and policymakers, however, the case was about the appropriate role of competition policy in the
new economy.  Antitrust critics claim that the nineteenth century Sherman Act is ill-suited for the
high-technology markets of the twenty-first century.  Others argue that the Sherman Act provides
a broad constitution for antitrust enforcement that is flexible enough to protect both the interests
of consumers and the ability of firms to compete in high-technology markets.
In the Microsoft case, the government (by which we mean the U.S. Department of Justice,
19 State attorneys general, and attorney general of the District of Columbia that brought the case)
asserted that Microsoft engaged in anticompetitive conduct designed to maintain its operating
system monopoly to the detriment of consumers.  According to the government, antitrust
enforcement would rein in the Microsoft monopoly and result in more competition and
innovation in the software industry. In its defense, Microsoft contended that the company is a
vigorous competitor that benefited consumers by supplying high quality and innovative products.
 According to Microsoft, antitrust action against it would dampen incentives for competition and
slow software innovation.
In this paper, we analyze the central economic issues raised by the Microsoft case: the
source and strength of Microsoft's market power, the competitive effects of Microsoft’s practices,
the degree of consumer harm, and proposed remedies.4
Early Skirmishes
Microsoft's antitrust woes began in 1990 when the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
launched an investigation of the company.  After three years, the FTC's legal staff -- but not its
economics staff -- recommended that the Commission bring a case focusing on Microsoft's
licensing practices with personal computer manufacturers.  The FTC investigation ended in
February 1993 when the Commission deadlocked in a 2-2 vote, with one commissioner recused
(Lopatka and Page, 1995, p. 324).
The U.S. Department of Justice continued the investigation of Microsoft’s conduct and,
on July 15, 1994, brought a complaint alleging that Microsoft used exclusionary and
anticompetitive contracts with personal computer manufacturers unlawfully to maintain its
monopoly of personal computer operating systems. Simultaneous with the filing of the
complaint, Microsoft and the Department of Justice entered into a consent decree in which
Microsoft agreed to abide by certain restrictions on its licensing arrangements (United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 1995-2 Trade Cas. P 71,096 (D.D.C. 1995)).
1  After a year of legal wrangling,
an appellate court approved the consent decree on June 16, 1995.
Disputes over the scope and interpretation of the decree soon arose.  Among other
conduct restrictions, the consent decree (Section IV.E) stipulated:
Microsoft shall not enter into any License Agreement in which the terms of that
agreement are expressly or impliedly conditioned upon: (i) the licensing of any other
Covered Product, Operating System Software product or other product (provided,
however, that this provision in and of itself shall not be construed to prohibit
Microsoft from developing integrated products); …
The force of this restriction turns on the definitions of what constitute "other" and "integrated"
products.  Not long after Microsoft and the Department of Justice signed the consent decree,5
Microsoft began requiring computer manufacturers to license and install Microsoft's Internet
Explorer browser as a condition for being able to obtain a license for the Windows 95 operating
system.  Microsoft argued that the Internet Explorer browser was part of the operating system,
not a separate product.  The Department of Justice disagreed and sought an injunction against
Microsoft.
On December 11, 1997, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ordered Microsoft to offer its
Windows 95 operating system and Internet Explorer as separate products.  Microsoft appealed
his ruling.  The appeals court reversed Judge Jackson’s order, ruling that Windows 95 and
Internet Explorer provided computer users with functionality that did not exist with separate
programs and thus passed the “integrated product” provision of the consent decree.  (U.S. v.
Microsoft, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, No. 97-5343, June 23,
1998 at footnote 14).  Whatever one thinks of the merits of the two sides' positions following the
1995 consent decree, it is clear that the conduct remedy did not work as the Department of
Justice had intended.
The Battle is Joined
On May 18, 1998, the government brought an antitrust case against Microsoft alleging
that the company had monopolized the markets for personal computer operating systems and
browsers.  (U.S. v. Microsoft, 1998). The government's case against Microsoft rested on
allegations that Microsoft compelled computer manufacturers to license and install Internet
Explorer, entered into contracts that tended to exclude rivals, and engaged in various forms of
predatory conduct.6
Microsoft and the government both considered Internet browsers combined with the Java
language and server-based applications to be particularly potent sources of potential competition
for Windows.  In theory, the Java programming language offered a standard to which creators of
applications, such as spreadsheet and word processing programs, could write without regard for
the underlying operating system. Java did this by providing a “middleware” layer of software
between applications programs and the underlying operating system.  Netscape was a threat to
Microsoft because its Navigator browser was a distribution vehicle for Java that could further its
acceptance as an operating-system-independent language for application programs.  In addition,
there was the risk that Netscape Navigator itself could grow into a substitute for Microsoft
Windows or facilitate server-based applications that made minimal use of the desktop operating
system.  These are the outcomes the government sought to preserve and Bill Gates feared when
he wrote that Netscape threatened to “commoditize the underlying operating system.” (Gates,
May 26, 1995).
The government alleged that Microsoft sought to eliminate the competitive threat posed
by Java and Netscape in two ways.  The first was to eliminate Netscape's browser as a
commercially viable product through an offer of market division and -- after that offer was
rejected -- a combination of predatory and exclusionary actions.  The second was to undermine
Java as an operating-system-independent platform by promoting a Windows-specific version of
Java.
The Assessment of Market Power
A firm’s conduct is unlikely to have significant adverse consequences for economic7
welfare if the firm lacks significant market power.  Therefore, the assessment of market power is
the initial step in a typical economic antitrust analysis.  The courts commonly assess market
power by first defining the relevant market(s) affected by a firm’s conduct.  A relevant market is
a set of products that consumers consider to be reasonably close substitutes for each other (see,
for example, U.S. Department of Justice, 1992, §1.11).  Once a relevant market has been defined,
the assessment of market power moves to the calculation of market share, examination of
competitive interactions, determination of the conditions of entry, and analysis of other pertinent
structural features of the market (Katz and Shapiro, 1999, discuss the assessment of market
power in software markets).
The government alleged that Microsoft was a monopolist in the relevant market
comprising Intel-compatible personal computer operating systems.  The government reasoned
that buyers of Intel-compatible personal computers have no substitutes for operating systems
designed to work on those systems.  Microsoft's share of shipments of Intel-based personal
computer operating systems has been 90 percent or more in recent years.
The government also argued that another operating system would be hard-pressed to
displace Windows directly.  IBM was reported to have spent more than $1 billion dollars to
develop, test, and market its OS/2 operating system as an alternative to Windows (Gilbert, 1998).
 The new operating system was a commercial failure, in part because IBM could not overcome
the chicken-and-egg problem that arises from “network effects,” whereby the demand for a
product increases with the number of other users of the product or with the number of
complementary goods and services for that product.  Specifically, because of switching costs and
consumers’ desires for a variety of applications programs, an operating system cannot gain8
widespread acceptance until it has a large set of available applications.  But, because of
economies of scale and sunk costs in software development, applications programmers do not
want to write to an operating system unless there is a large base of users.  The government
labeled this problem the “applications barrier to entry.”
Professor Richard Schmalensee, Microsoft's chief economics expert at trial, countered
that competition in the personal computer software market was among "platforms," not operating
systems.
2  A platform is a set of software interfaces to which programmers can write applications
such as spreadsheets or schedulers.  Platforms include operating systems, such as the Mac OS,
Sun Solaris, and Linux, and various forms of middleware including web server/browser software,
Lotus Notes, and Sun's Java, that are intermediate between operating systems and desktop
applications.  Schmalensee argued that Microsoft faced significant competition from existing and
future software platforms, any one of which could emerge as the new standard for desktop
computing.
Schmalensee also asserted that, in high-technology markets, traditional measures of
market share provide misleading assessments of the degree of competition.  Markets with
significant network effects, technological progress, and production economies of scale can
exhibit catastrophic entry, whereby one product dominates the market until another product is
sufficiently superior that it becomes the new network bandwagon.  Rivalry in such markets can
take the form of competition to become a dominant firm -- competition for the market, rather
than competition within the market.  Thus, computer software markets may be characterized by a
succession of temporary monopolies (although multiple firms can prosper simultaneously if there
is strong product differentiation or cross-supplier product compatibility).9
To a large extent the government and Microsoft agreed about the potential for technical
change and catastrophic entry in the software industry.  However, the government asserted that
Microsoft preserved its monopoly by using exclusionary and predatory tactics to block
catastrophic entry, while Microsoft claimed that it was just competing in the face of huge forces
of change in the industry.
Another argument raised by Schmalensee was that Microsoft did not behave like a firm
with monopoly power. Working backward from an estimate of the elasticity of demand for
personal computers, he calculated that the monopoly price of Windows should have been at least
16 times the price actually charged (see also, Reddy et al., 1999).  He attributed the difference to
platform competition ignored by the government. 
Professor Franklin Fisher was one of the government's expert witnesses, and Professor
Daniel Rubinfeld was the U.S. Department of Justice’s chief economist during most of the trial.
They argued that Microsoft's prices were consistent with long-run monopoly pricing once one
takes into account factors that encourage Microsoft to restrain its prices, such as the value of
growing its installed base, raising demand for complementary products, and discouraging
software pirating (Fisher and Rubinfeld, 2000, pp. 13-14).
3  Moreover, they argued that the
relatively low price charged to personal computer manufacturers for Windows licenses could
represent compensation for Microsoft's onerous contract restrictions.
Fundamentally, the difference between the government's characterization of Microsoft's
market power and Microsoft's position is that the government considered Microsoft a monopolist
that faced limited potential competition from other platforms, whereas Microsoft saw the market
as already invigorated with significant actual platform competition.  It appears clear to us that,10
largely because of network effects and the applications barrier to entry, Microsoft did possess
significant market power.  Microsoft certainly had the ability to raise prices significantly above
marginal costs.  Indeed, Microsoft possessed the ability to raise prices significantly above long-
run average costs, as suggested by the large multiple of Microsoft’s market value to the cost of its
asset base.
This conclusion does not prove that Microsoft used its market power to disadvantage
consumers. The possession of market power is in itself not objectionable under antitrust policy
(for example, U.S Department of Justice, 1995, §2.2).  Indeed, it would not make economic sense
to punish a firm that possesses market power solely as a consequence of having developed a
superior product, because doing so would erode the incentives for innovation.  We return to the
issue of whether Microsoft abused its market power below.
In addition to creating substantial market power for Microsoft, the applications barrier to
entry was central to the government's theory of why Microsoft took the actions it did with respect
to browsers and Java.  According to the government, Microsoft had incentives to work hard to
protect that barrier by ensuring that other operating systems could not share a common set of
applications through middleware.  The reason middleware, such as Java or a web browser, is a
threat to Microsoft in a way that full operating systems are not is the following.  If a user were to
adopt an operating system other than Windows, he would have to forego the large base of
Windows applications.  Thus, an operating systems entrant either has to offer consumers much
lower value or has to incur large sunk costs to develop (or subsidize) a wide range of applications
programs before there is a large user base to purchase them.  Middleware written on top of
Windows would not suffer from this problem.  Users could adopt the middleware and still make11
use of the large number of programs that run on Windows.  Hence, middleware that offered
useful new features to a wide range of users would have the potential to become widely adopted,
which would then make it attractive for applications programmers to write to it.  As this
happened, new applications would not be associated with a particular operating system, which
would reduce the applications barrier to entry for operating systems.
Evans and Schmalensee (2000a, pp. 62-63) argued that the government's claim that there
were high barriers to entry but that middleware could overcome them was internally inconsistent.
We do not see any inconsistency in the position that middleware was a significant crack in the
armor of what would otherwise be a strong applications barrier to entry and that Microsoft
attempted to patch that crack.
Hall and Hall (1999, p. 25) argued that if  -- as Fisher and Rubinfeld assert -- the threat of
software piracy or other factors unrelated to the extent of competition drove Microsoft's
operating system pricing decisions, then Microsoft's challenged conduct might have no influence
on the equilibrium price.  Consequently, Microsoft would not have anticompetitive incentives. 
This argument, however, ignores the possibility that, absent the challenged conduct, the strength
of competition could have grown to limit Microsoft’s market power.  The existence of significant
market power, even if in the short run constrained by factors other than competition, can provide
stimulus for Microsoft to engage in conduct intended to protect that market power in the long
run.
A Closer Look at Allegedly Harmful Conduct
The government alleged two sets of closely related mechanisms by which Microsoft's12
practices weakened competition and harmed consumers: exclusionary behavior and several types
of predatory behavior.
Exclusionary Behavior
Exclusionary behavior entails denying rivals access to some resource or set of consumers
in order to raise the rivals' costs and weaken their ability to compete (for example, Salop and
Scheffman, 1987).  The government charged that Microsoft used several types of contractual
arrangements that tended to exclude competitors (U.S. v. Microsoft, 1998, para. 75-102). One set
of arrangements was with on-line and Internet service providers, such as America Online (AOL)
and AT&T Worldnet, in which Microsoft agreed to include a feature in its operating system that
made it easy for a user to establish an account with a service provider, but only if the service
provider agreed to deny most or all of its subscribers a choice of Internet browser.
4  A second set
of agreements were made with personal computer manufacturers, under which the manufacturers
could neither remove the Internet Explorer icon nor feature a rival browser more prominently
than Internet Explorer.  Finally, in a third set of agreements, Microsoft offered Internet content
providers preferential, no-cost placement on the Internet Explorer "channel bar" in return for
their agreement to promote Internet Explorer as their browser of choice, not to accept
compensation for featuring their content on Netscape's browser, and for customizing their content
so that it was more attractive when accessed using Internet Explorer.  (U.S. v. Microsoft, 2000 b.)
The traditional "Chicago" view of exclusionary contracts and exclusive dealing
arrangements is that they must promote efficiency because the buyers in these transactions would
not agree to contracts that made themselves worse off.  (See Bork, 1978, p. 309).  There is,
however, a fundamental flaw in this argument: a buyer may agree to an exclusive contract13
without taking into account harm to third parties.  A buyer who accounts for only a small fraction
of industry purchases has little reason to believe that its individual decisions affect the overall
degree of competition in a market.  But if a large number of buyers accept inducements to deal
exclusively with a single supplier, the overall effect can be to reduce competition to the detriment
of consumers (Rasmussen, Ramseyer, and Wiley, 1991). This analysis applies with even greater
force when a seller with market power can strategically price discriminate and bargain
sequentially with buyers (Segal and Whinston, 2000).  A related argument holds even with a
single buyer if the bargaining takes place before other competitors have arrived.  By signing a
long-term exclusive dealing agreement with penalty clauses, the buyer and incumbent seller can
force an efficient entrant to compensate the buyer for breaking the agreement.  In this way, the
buyer and incumbent seller can appropriate some of the benefits from entry in the form of higher
profits for themselves (Aghion and Bolton, 1987).
 In many cases, exclusionary practices that raise rivals’ costs will lower economic
welfare.  However, there are circumstances under which such practices can increase efficiency
and consumer welfare.  For example, raising an inefficient supplier's costs can increase total
surplus by shifting share to more efficient producers (Katz and Shapiro, 1985).  And, as
discussed below, elimination of a rival may promote innovation in some circumstances. 
Moreover, exclusive dealing that raises distribution costs for other manufacturers may also
support efficient relationship-specific investments by the parties entering into the exclusive
contract.  The net welfare effects can be positive or negative (Segal and Whinston, 1998, and
Gilbert, 2000). Given these mixed theoretical predictions about the welfare effects of exclusive
dealing, antitrust analysis must focus on the institutional details of the specific practices at issue14
in a given case to determine their effects.
Microsoft defended its contracts on the grounds that they were in force when Internet
Explorer accounted for only a small share of browser usage and that the contracts enabled
Microsoft to build share rapidly to become a more formidable competitor to Netscape.
 5  By
describing Microsoft as if it consisted only of a fledgling browser striving to compete against
established Netscape, this defense sidesteps the fact that Microsoft possessed considerable
market power in personal computer operating systems. The question is whether Microsoft used
this market power, in combination with exclusionary practices, to hobble a potential competitor
to the detriment of consumers.
Moreover, whatever the theoretical arguments about exclusive contracts in general, in this
specific case there is little reason to believe that most of these contracts promoted efficiency. 
Microsoft presented no evidence, and we are unaware of any evidence, that contracts with on-line
and Internet service providers promoted relationship-specific investments.
6  Instead, the main
consequence was to disadvantage Netscape and other browser competitors.  Microsoft asserted
that its requirements that personal computer manufacturers not remove the Internet Explorer icon
and not feature a rival browser more prominently than Internet Explorer were justified as
promoting a standard Windows "look and feel."  However, the government responded that
Microsoft's actions belied this claim, because Microsoft permitted personal computer
manufacturers to modify the Windows desktop when doing so did not promote a competing
browser (U.S. v. Microsoft, 1999, Section V.C).
In contrast, Microsoft's contracts with Internet content providers had plausible efficiency
benefits.  Microsoft offered favorable placement on the Internet Explorer channel bar to Internet15
content providers who designed their content to favor Internet Explorer.  This arrangement might
have generated incentives for these firms to make complementary investments with Microsoft. 
Indeed, Judge Jackson concluded the contracts with Internet content providers were not
anticompetitive.
Predatory Conduct
Predatory behavior typically involves an initial stage during which a firm offers a product
at an unprofitably low price as a means of driving rivals from the market and facilitating the later
exercise of market power.  While useful for organizing discussion, the distinction between
exclusionary and predatory practices can be blurred. To the extent that Microsoft sacrificed short-
run profits to obtain exclusionary contracts and thus reduce Netscape’s long-run competitive
threat, an exclusionary contract can be viewed as a form of predation.  Conversely, by denying a
rival sales that are necessary to realize increasing returns, predatory behavior can raise the rival’s
costs and thus look like exclusionary behavior.
Judges, lawyers, and economists have struggled over how to distinguish conduct that is
predatory from that which is vigorously competitive. For example, Areeda and Turner (1975)
proposed a rule that predatory conduct occurs if a firm prices below its average variable cost of
production.  However, such a rule may afford too much latitude for pricing that has predatory
effects in industries like software, where average variable costs of production are close to zero. 
At the same time, the rule may provide too little scope for firms to use low prices as promotional
investments, particularly in markets with network effects (for a preliminary analysis, see Farrell
and Katz, 1999). A more general definition of predation, proposed by Ordover and Willig (1981),16
is any business strategy that is profitable only because of the long-run benefits of eliminating one
or more competitors.  This definition sensibly captures anticompetitive conduct -- including
nonprice conduct -- that would harm competition yet would not be deemed predatory under the
cost-based Areeda-Turner test.  However, the meaning of eliminating a competitor may not be a
precise concept in a market with network effects (Farrell and Katz, 1999).  Moreover, the
Ordover-Willig definition should be modified to account for the fact that consumers and
efficiency can be harmed when the prey is weakened, even if it is not eliminated.
In a typical predation case, the plaintiff claims that the defendant sacrificed short-run
profits from sales of a product to eliminate competition and subsequently raise prices for that
product in the long run.  Here, however, the government asserted that Microsoft sacrificed
browser profits in the short run primarily to preserve its operating system monopoly in the long
run.
At first glance, predation against a complementary product might appear puzzling. 
According to the "one-monopoly-rent" argument, a monopolist would never engage in predation
against a competitively supplied complementary product. To see why, suppose that each customer
is willing to pay $100 for a package consisting of products A and B; in the Microsoft case, think
of these as an operating system and a web browser. Suppose that firm M is the monopoly supplier
of product A. In the first case, the complementary product B is supplied competitively at a price
equal to its marginal cost of, say, $10. As a result, the monopolist can charge $90 (= 100-10) for
its product A. Now, suppose that the monopolist forces consumers to purchase a bundle
consisting of A and B.  Consumers still would pay at most $100 for the bundle, the marginal cost
of product B would still be $10, and the monopolist would earn $90 from selling A.  In other17
words, "extending" its monopoly from A to both A and B would not increase the firm's profits.
There are two reasons why the one-monopoly-rent argument does not apply to
Microsoft’s situation.  First, as we discuss below, Netscape Navigator initially was priced
significantly above marginal cost and, consequently, Microsoft had incentives to influence
competition in the browser market.  Second, the one-monopoly-rent argument does not address
the fact that predation against complementary product B may affect the threat of entry faced by
product A.  (Aron and Wildman (1999), Carlton and Waldman (2000), and Whinston (1990) offer
models of bundling to deter entry.)
The government alleged that Microsoft tried to keep Netscape Navigator from becoming
well established as a browser so that it could not evolve into an operating system competitor. 
The government also alleged that Microsoft wanted to block Navigator as a distribution vehicle
for Java, as well as undermine Java directly, because the widespread deployment of Java as an
operating-system-independent programming language threatened to reduce the applications
barrier to entry in operating systems.
The government attacked several Microsoft practices as predatory.
Pricing Internet Explorer Below Cost. Microsoft gave Internet Explorer away for free and
paid Apple to use its browser. The government argued that Microsoft's actions were predatory
because they could be profitable only after taking into account benefits to Microsoft from the
elimination of competition (Fisher and Rubinfeld, 2000, p. 20). Microsoft responded that the
profitability of its actions did not depend on excluding competition from Netscape.  Microsoft
claimed that wide distribution of Internet Explorer at a zero price made business sense because it
made personal computers more attractive and thus increased the sales of its Windows operating18
system and other software.  Microsoft also said that giving away its browser product for free was
a valid business model, one followed by many software companies, because it would generate
future revenues. For example, a free browser could help Microsoft establish an Internet portal on
which it could sell advertising.
One the surface, Microsoft’s position fits the model of Farrell and Katz (2000).  In that
model, product A is monopolized by firm M and the market for complementary product B is
imperfectly competitive.  By integrating into the supply of product B, firm M can engage in a
"squeeze," where it sets the quality-adjusted price of its variant of product B lower than would a
stand-alone supplier.  The squeeze can force independent suppliers to charge lower quality-
adjusted prices for their variants of product B and thus allow firm M to earn greater profits from
the sale of complementary product A.  In this model, firm M neither extends its monopoly nor
acts in a predatory fashion, although independent suppliers could be expected to accuse it of
doing so.  Instead, firm M lets the most efficient supplier of component B make sales, and firm M
takes its profits by charging higher prices for component A.
7
If Microsoft were concerned with increasing the value of its personal computer platform,
however, it should have supported any well-made browser product, without regard to whether the
browser was supplied by Microsoft or by a rival.  Trial evidence submitted by the government
suggested that Microsoft did not want to support a rival browser, no matter how good the product
might be, and was mainly concerned with reducing Netscape's Navigator sales.  The government
hauled out a stack of Microsoft e-mails that the government claimed revealed Microsoft’s intent
to quash Netscape.  The government also showed that Microsoft had carried out studies of the
impact on Netscape’s revenues of giving Internet Explorer away for free,
8 and a government19
witness testified that Paul Maritz (a senior Microsoft executive) informed him that Microsoft's
Internet strategy was "to cut off Netscape's air supply, ... by giving away free browsers, Microsoft
was going to keep Netscape from getting off the ground.”
9
The government also noted that, if Microsoft's strategy of giving away Internet Explorer
for free was based on promoting sales of its software products, that rationale could not explain
why Microsoft paid Apple to take its browser.  To the extent that Microsoft was motivated by
sales of software such as Office for the Macintosh, these concerns would be best served by
encouraging Apple to use the best browser.  The government also did not accept Microsoft’s
claims that its browser distribution strategy was profitable because it promoted the sale of web
services, such as a portal site.
Tying and Bundling.  To the government, the “integration” of Internet Explorer with
Windows 95 and later versions of the operating system was little different from the contractual
bundling of separate products.  The government alleged that Microsoft bundled the operating
system and browser as a way to protect its existing operating system monopoly by blocking
Netscape Navigator from growing into a platform competitor.  The government's main concern
was not that Microsoft offered an integrated product that combined Internet Explorer and
Windows, but rather that Microsoft refused to offer customers the option of taking Windows
without the browser (Fisher and Rubinfeld, 2000, p. 23).  Under the government’s theory, the
bundling was predatory rather than exclusionary.  A consumer with Internet Explorer already
loaded on her personal computer still could install and make use of Navigator.  However, the
incremental cost to her of using Internet Explorer was zero.
Microsoft responded to the government's bundling charge by contending that the browser20
was an integral component of the operating system and that bundling Internet Explorer with the
operating system was a product improvement no different from including a file management
program with the operating system. Moreover, Microsoft argued, even if the operating system
and browser were distinct products, there are plausible efficiency advantages from bundling in
the form of lower distribution and transactions costs.  Microsoft also noted that other operating
system vendors, such as BeOS, Linux, and Sun, bundled browsers with their operating systems.
Polluting the Java language. Microsoft developed a version of Java that was optimized for
Windows and encouraged programmers to write applications for this version.  The government
alleged that Microsoft tried to "pollute" Java so that it would not become a standardized language
that would run equally well on all operating systems. Microsoft's response was that it was merely
optimizing Java to exploit the advanced features of Windows, to the benefit of consumers.
10
According to the government, Microsoft's Java strategy was predatory because Microsoft
was incurring unnecessary costs in the short run to undermine the middleware threat posed by a
widely deployed, operating-system-independent programming language.  Judge Jackson agreed
with the government in finding that Microsoft acted in ways that did not support its efficiency
arguments, but were instead intended to undermine the portability of Java.  Judge Jackson
concluded that: Microsoft designed its Java developer tools to encourage developers to write
applications using certain abbreviations that could only be executed properly by Microsoft's
version of the Java runtime environment for Windows; Microsoft refused to incorporate as
standard components certain Java developments that would enhance portability in the version of
Java that it shipped with Internet Explorer 4.0; and Gates pressured Intel not to share its work on
a high performance Java virtual machine with Sun or Netscape or to allow Netscape to include21
the Intel product with Navigator. In addition, Judge Jackson found that Microsoft pressured
software vendors, such as the developer of the RealNetworks multimedia player, to rely on
Windows-specific Java technology rather than more portable Java implementations in their
products.  (U.S. v. Microsoft, 2000b, Section VI.  See also Lemley and McGowan (1998) on
Microsoft’s opposition to certifying Java as an international standard.)
Did Microsoft Neutralize the Threat of Navigator/Java Competition?
There appears to be ample evidence in the trial record that Microsoft intended to
eliminate the middleware threat to Windows posed by the combination of Netscape Navigator
and Java.  Has Microsoft succeeded in annihilating browser competition?  Probably not.  During
the Microsoft trial, America Online purchased Netscape for approximately $4 billion in stock, so
that Netscape is now a subsidiary of, and has the backing of, the world's largest on-line service
provider.  Yet by tipping the market in favor of Internet Explorer, Microsoft's conduct
undermined the ability of Netscape Navigator to attract software developers to write applications
that will run in the Netscape/Java environment.  According to AdKnowledge, Inc., Internet
Explorer’s share of monthly browser usage increased from 20 percent in January 1997 to more
than 50 percent by August 1998, and other data suggest it has increased since 1998.
11  Judge
Jackson concluded that Microsoft's anticompetitive conduct contributed to Netscape's decision
not to do the engineering work necessary to continue bundling up-to-date "Java Virtual
Machines" -- the programs that interpret Java for a particular operating system -- that would be
compliant with Sun's standards in future versions of Navigator (U.S. v. Microsoft, 2000b, at para.
397).22
Did Microsoft Harm Consumers?
The courts have long recognized that antitrust policy is concerned with harm to
competition, not harm to competitors, because competitors can be casualties of aggressive
competition that benefits consumers and/or increases efficiency.  Did Microsoft harm consumers
in the sense that they would have faced lower prices -- adjusted for the quality and variety of the
available products -- in the absence of Microsoft's challenged conduct?
Assessment of consumer harm from predation is difficult because predation can benefit
consumers in the short run while harming them in the long run. For example, consumers were not
clearly worse off in the short run as the result of Microsoft’s Java development, and some
consumers may have been better off because Microsoft's implementation of the Java virtual
machine provided advantages for Windows users (“Performance Tests: Compatibility,” 1998).
However, what might appear to be an obvious short-term consumer benefit of Microsoft’s
allegedly predatory behavior -- namely, receiving a free copy of Internet Explorer bundled with
Windows rather than paying for a browser -- might be illusory.  The availability of free browsers
may have allowed Microsoft to raise (or avoid lowering) the price of Windows.  To the extent
that Microsoft internalized the benefits from free browsers through the Windows price, the short-
run consumer benefits from giving away Internet Explorer and bundling it with Windows were
limited.
The main thrust of the government’s case was that, in the long run, consumers would
suffer from reduced competition among both browsers and operating systems. The result could
be higher prices in the long run, or a reduction of investment in R&D and product development23
that reduced or degraded the set of available products.
The need to consider long-run effects of Microsoft's actions raises a number of
difficulties.  First, there is the matter of predicting what will happen in a market subject to rapid
technological change.  One cannot be certain that the combination of alternative browsers and an
operating-system-independent Java programming language would have emerged as a serious
platform competitor absent Microsoft's challenged conduct.  For example, one obstacle to the
widespread acceptance of Java is the additional execution time required to translate the Java
code.  Clearly, however, Microsoft perceived that such competition was possible.
Second, the link between the degree of competition and the degree of innovation is
complex. Certain theoretical arguments support the conclusion that large firm size and high
market share are conducive to R&D investment, because a firm in such a market can amortize the
fixed costs of the R&D and appropriate most of the R&D's benefits.  Catastrophic entry,
combined with large investment demands, can necessitate concentrated markets as a means to
achieve the returns necessary to motivate large investments that must be recouped over relatively
short periods of time before the dawning of the next technological revolution.  On the other hand,
as Sir John Hicks (1935, p. 8) wrote: "The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life." There is
considerable anecdotal evidence that competitive market structures are more innovative than are
protected monopolies, although econometric evidence on the general linkage between
concentration and innovation is inconclusive.
While it is impossible to make definitive statements about the linkage between market
structure and innovation in general, competition has stimulated innovation in browsers and
operating systems.  For example, Evans and Schmalensee (2000a, pp. 45-46) concluded that, by24
increasing competition in the browser market, "Microsoft's actions speeded innovation in Web-
browsing software and left consumers with the choice of two first-rate browsers instead of one." 
Moreover, Microsoft appears to have accelerated the introduction of DOS 5.0 in response to
competition from DR-DOS and to have accelerated the development of Windows in response to
competition from Apple and OS/2.  Further, the continuing development of Apple's operating
system suggests that significant innovation by firms with much smaller sales than Microsoft is
feasible.
A third difficulty in assessing the long-run consequences of Microsoft's conduct is that,
even if one has found there would be greater competition and more innovation absent Microsoft's
actions, as a matter of theory the linkage between innovation and welfare is ambiguous.   For
example, firms may enter rent-seeking races in which they invest more than the socially efficient
amounts in R&D (for a review of the theoretical literature on R&D competition, see Reinganum,
1989). As an empirical matter, however, private incentives for R&D typically are much lower
than the social benefits of the R&D because private firms typically are unable to appropriate all
of the benefits that their R&D generates for the economy (Griliches, 1992; Jones and Williams,
1998). Certainly, no evidence of socially excessive R&D investment was presented at trial. 
It appears to us that if the record in the case had consisted solely of the fact that Microsoft
took the actions the government alleged to be predatory -- that is, giving Internet Explorer away
for free, bundling Internet Explorer with Windows, and creating a non-standard implementation
of Java -- Microsoft could have made a plausible case that it was engaged in a non-predatory
squeeze of Netscape, was improving Java, and its conduct did not harm consumers.
There are, however, two significant problems with this interpretation of the actual record.25
 First, there is significant evidence that Microsoft took actions for the explicit purpose of harming
competition.  Economists are often loath to endorse an intent-based approach to evaluating firm
behavior because managers often use florid language to describe their actions in memoranda
("kill the competition") and even ill-intended actions may not harm consumers in some cases. 
We fully agree that caution is warranted in interpreting such evidence.  However, when there is a
clear economic rationale that certain types of conduct can harm competition and lead to higher
prices, and there is evidence that managerial intent was to harm competitors, it can be appropriate
to use this evidence to sort harmful from innocent behavior. Of course, one has to be sensitive to
the possibility that businesses will strategically write memoranda that put soothing spins on their
descriptions of firm conduct.
Second, in addition to the allegedly predatory actions, Microsoft undertook a variety of
exclusionary tactics that cannot be explained as procompetitive "squeezes" on Netscape.  If
Microsoft had been trying to maximize its returns on Windows by ensuring that consumers
enjoyed maximal benefits from complementary browsers, it would not have worked so hard to
make it difficult for consumers to use non-Microsoft browsers.  In particular, Microsoft would
not have taken measures to discourage consumers from using Netscape's browser. 
Judge Jackson concluded that Microsoft's contracts with Internet and on-line service
providers and with computer manufacturers were exclusionary and contributed to a verdict of
monopolization.  However, he also found that because the contracts did not completely foreclose
competition from Netscape and other browsers, the contracts were not illegal in and of
themselves.  Judge Jackson's finding notwithstanding, imposing costs on competitors can harm
consumers even if the competitors are not completely driven from the market.  Netscape was26
forced to pursue other distribution alternatives to compensate for Microsoft's restrictive
arrangements, thereby increasing Netscape’s costs of distributing its browser to consumers.  At
least some consumers were harmed because they were unable to obtain their preferred product or
they incurred greater costs to do so (for example, time spent downloading the product) as the
result of Microsoft's practices.  The contracts do not appear to have contributed to efficiencies
that would offset these harms.  Moreover, in the presence of network effects, a lower current
market share can have negative feedback effects on future sales and thus weaken incentives for
product improvements and future competition.
Neither the government nor Microsoft offered numerical projections of welfare effects. 
Our review of the case suggests the following overall effects.  In the short run, Microsoft’s
allegedly predatory actions of developing a Windows-optimized version of Java, giving Internet
Explorer away for free, and bundling Internet Explorer with Windows probably benefited
consumers directly.  In addition, consumers benefited from the latter two actions because they
forced Netscape to make its browser available for free.  The short-run consumer gains from a free
or bundled browser may have been limited, however, because a zero browser price may have
enabled Microsoft to maintain the price of Windows at a higher level than it otherwise would
have.  In the short run, Microsoft’s contracts with personal computer manufacturers and on-line
service providers imposed costs on consumers who preferred the Netscape browser.  In the long
run, consumers were likely harmed because much of Microsoft’s challenged conduct reduced the
probability that Netscape/Java would emerge as a platform competitor.  The contracts with
Internet content providers, however, had potential efficiency benefits.27
Remedies
On April 3, 2000, Judge Jackson found Microsoft guilty of violating the Sherman Act
(U.S. v. Microsoft, 2000c).  The government and Microsoft then proposed remedies.  Both parties
proposed conduct remedies that would constrain certain aspects of Microsoft's behavior, such as
the use of exclusive contracts and prohibitions on removing the Internet Explorer icon.  The
government proposed more extensive conduct remedies than did Microsoft, as well as a
structural divestiture of the company into two parts.  One part would receive the Windows
operating system; the other would receive the applications programs and all other Microsoft lines
of business.  Both parts would get intellectual property rights to the Internet Explorer browser,
but the operating systems company would be limited in its ability to develop, license, or
distribute modified or derivative versions of the browser (U.S. v. Microsoft, 2000a, Section 1.c).
From an efficiency perspective, remedies should stop a firm that has engaged in
anticompetitive conduct from continuing to do so and should deter that firm and others from
engaging in similar anticompetitive conduct in the future.  At the same time, remedies should not
introduce large administrative costs, deter efficient conduct, or create opportunities for firms to
engage in costly strategic behavior.
Judge Jackson found that Microsoft illegally sustained the applications barrier to the entry
of operating system competitors.  Conduct remedies, such as mandatory unbundling of Internet
Explorer from Windows, deal directly with Microsoft’s challenged behavior. However, as
experience with the earlier consent decree illustrates, conduct remedies can be difficult to enforce
and may not be sufficient to deter Microsoft from engaging in other behavior that has similar
effects.  In addition, conduct remedies may provide a forum for competitors to challenge28
Microsoft’s business decisions -– including those that might benefit consumers -- with a
potentially chilling effect on innovation.
Compared to conduct requirements, structural remedies typically require less regulatory
oversight and can be less susceptible to strategic intervention by competitors. But structural
remedies may fail if the required structure does not reflect the efficient organization of the
industry.
The government's theory was that its proposed structural remedy would invigorate
competition by encouraging the applications company to port its software to other operating
systems or to develop its own operating system.  In either case, Windows would face more
vigorous competition.  The breakup was also intended to encourage the operating system
company to assure interoperability with applications programs from all vendors.  More generally,
each company would have incentives to encourage competition in the market for the
complementary product.
By relying on market forces, the proposed remedy sidesteps the prospect of continuing
government oversight of Microsoft. It does not order the applications division to work with other
operating systems vendors. It does not seek to define terms like "operating system" and then set
up restrictions about what such a system can or cannot include. It does not contain permanent
line-of-business restrictions on the Microsoft offspring.
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However, the proposed breakup of a huge company would certainly entail substantial
direct costs of reorganization. Moreover, the divestiture might well impose indirect costs through
its effects on the two companies' abilities and incentives to cooperate, including cooperation in
pricing and product development.  The concern with respect to pricing is the "double29
marginalization problem" identified by Cournot (1838).  Suppose that every consumer of a
personal computer requires one operating system and one application program (for example, a
word processor).  If the monopoly supplier of the operating system is also the monopoly supplier
of the application, it will take foregone application sales into account when analyzing the effects
of an increase in the price of the operating system.  But if a separate firm sells the application, the
operating system monopolist will not count lost application sales as a cost and thus has less
incentive to restrain price.  A similar logic applies to pricing the application.  Hence, this
argument suggests that the sum of the operating system and application prices set by an
integrated monopolist will be lower than the sum of those prices when set separately by two
independent firms each with significant market power.
The separation of suppliers of complementary products can have other nefarious effects. 
The separate operating system and applications companies might not have incentives to push new
products that require commitments from both the operating system and application sides of the
business.  The introduction of Windows provides a suggestive case study.  Microsoft had a strong
incentive to design and market applications that took advantage of the Windows graphical user
interface, because Microsoft could internalize benefits from the complementarities between
Windows and applications.  Independent companies, such as Lotus, were slower to make the
transition to Windows for their applications than was Microsoft.
It is impossible to predict with confidence how splitting Microsoft in two would actually
work and how large any coordination losses would be. The two companies would have incentives
to reach agreements to overcome the distortions induced by their separate structure, subject to
being allowed to do so by the remedy and antitrust law generally.  More broadly, the hope of the30
government is that divestiture would invigorate competition in both the operating systems and
applications markets.  If it occurred, stronger competition would reduce the double
marginalization problem and could even reduce the total price of software bundles from current
levels.
Some have argued for a structural remedy that would create immediate additional
competition in the market for personal computer operating systems by breaking Microsoft into an
applications company and several competing operating systems companies, often referred to as
the “Baby Bills.”  (The friend-of-the-court submission, U.S. v. Microsoft (2000e), is an example).
 Such a proposal offers the benefit of eliminating, or at least greatly reducing, the operating
systems market power that was the driving force for anticompetitive conduct.  However, this
proposal also raises substantial risks of imposing an inefficient market structure because the
efficient number of personal computer operating systems companies is unknown.  Moreover, the
relationship between innovation and market structure is not a simple one.  If market forces
compelled three Baby Bills to remain compatible with each other, innovation might be limited by
the rigidities inherent in a multi-firm effort to preserve standards.  Alternatively, a failure among
the Baby Bills to cooperate on standards could lead to fragmentation and the loss of network
effects.  Finally, there are no clear organizational lines along which to cut the operating system
company into multiple pieces.
Financial penalties are another potential remedy for unlawful conduct.  However, except
to compensate for harm suffered in its role as a consumer, the government cannot pursue
monetary damages in civil litigation.  But private parties can do so and have the added incentive
of treble damages.  While monetary damages have the disadvantage that they do not directly31
address the conduct at issue, they can serve as a deterrent to future conduct that likely would be
found to harm competition.  Moreover, monetary damages create neither large administrative
costs nor opportunities for strategic behavior (although litigation to obtain such damages can give
rise to both).
In any event, Judge Jackson accepted the government's proposed remedies -- including
the breakup -- although he immediately stayed their implementation pending appeals (U.S. v.
Microsoft, 2000d).
Conclusion
We find ourselves somewhat torn about remedies.  Microsoft took actions that appear to
have imposed short-run costs on consumers and reduced the long-run likelihood of platform
competition.  Thus, we believe that some remedy by the antitrust authorities is appropriate. 
While the competitive dynamics of the software industry challenge the ability of economic
analysis to make precise and certain predictions about competitive effects, the potential welfare
effects of business practices in these markets are too important to keep antitrust on the sidelines.
In the light of experience with the earlier consent degree, we are pessimistic that a limited
conduct remedy would be effective in this case.  Structural remedies, such as the divestiture
remedy proposed by the government and accepted by Judge Jackson, may be less subject to
gaming, but pose the risk of substantial costs.  Ironically, in this case, the most effective remedy
may be that the government’s victory eases the way for plaintiffs in private antitrust suits to
collect monetary damages, which could be sufficient to deter future anticompetitive conduct.  Of
course, at the time of this writing, the results of those suits -- and Microsoft’ appeal of Judge32
Jackson’s decision -- remain to be seen.33
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions from Dennis Carlton, Charles
Clarke, Brad DeLong, Neil Gandal, Tim Taylor, Hal Varian, and Michael Waldman. Gilbert was
Chief Economist at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice from 1993 to 1995
and consulted for the U.S. Department of Justice in the case.  This article is based on publicly
available information and does not rely on any confidential information.34
References
Aghion, Philippe and Patrick Bolton (1987), "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American
Economic Review, Vol. 77, pp. 388-401.
Areeda, Philip and Donald F. Turner (1975), "Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 88, pp. 697-733.
Aron, Debra J. and Steven S. Wildman (1999), "Economic Theories of Tying and
Foreclosure Applied B and Not Applied B in Microsoft," Antitrust, (Fall), pp. 48-52.
Carlton, Dennis W. and Michael Waldman (1998), "The Strategic Use of Tying to
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," Working Paper 6831, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Cass, Ronald A. and Keith N. Hylton (1999), "Preserving Competition: Economic
Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft," George Mason Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 1-40.
Cournot, Augustin A. (1838) "Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory
of Wealth," English translation of French original.  New York: Kelly.
   Evans, David S. and Richard Schmalensee (2000a), "Be Nice to Your Rivals: How the
Government is Selling an Antitrust Case without Consumer Harm in U.S. v. Microsoft," in Did
Microsoft Harm Consumers?: Two Opposing Views, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies, Washington, D.C. 
______________ and _________________ (2000b), "The Economics of the Microsoft Antitrust
Case: A Post-Trial Primer," NERA Working Paper.
Farrell, Joseph and Michael L. Katz (1999), "Predation in Networks Markets,"
unpublished manuscript, University of California at Berkeley.
_______________ and ______________ (2000), "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and
Integration in Systems Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming.35
Fisher, Franklin M. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld (2000), "United States v. Microsoft: An
Economic Analysis," in Did Microsoft Harm Consumers?: Two Opposing Views, AEI-Brookings
Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Washington, D.C.
Gates, Bill.  “The Internet Tidal Wave”, memorandum, May 26, 1995.
Gilbert, Richard J. (1998), "Networks, Standards, and the Use of Market Dominance:
Microsoft (1995)," in Kwoka, J. and L. White (eds.), The Antitrust Revolution: The Role of
Economics, 3
rd edition, Oxford University Press.
_______________ (2000), "Exclusive Dealing, Preferential Dealing, and Dynamic
Efficiency," Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 167-184.
Griliches, Zvi (1992) "The Search for R&D Spillovers," Scandinavian Journal of
Economics, Vol. 94 (Supplement), pp. 29-47.
Hall, Chris E. and Robert E. Hall (1999), "National Policy on Microsoft: A Neutral
Perspective: Version 2.0, Working Paper February 27, 1999, available at
http://www.NetEcon.com.
Hicks, John R. (1935) "Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly,"
Econometrica, Vol. 3, No. 1 pp. 1-20.
Jones, Charles and John Williams (1998), "Measuring the Social Return to R&D," The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 4, pp. 1119-1135.
Katz, Michael L., and Carl Shapiro (1985), "On the Licensing of Innovations," Rand
Journal of Economics, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Winter), pp. 504-520.
________________ and _______________ (1999), "Antitrust in Software Markets," in
Competition, Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, J.A.
Eisenach and Thomas Lenard (eds.), Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Lemley, Mark and David McGowan (1998), “Could Java Change Everything? The36
Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard,” Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 43, pp. 715-
Lopatka, John and Page, William H. (1995), "Microsoft, Monopolization, and Network
Externalities: Some Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in Antitrust Decisionmaking,"
Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 40, pp. 317-370.
Ordover, Janusz A. and Robert D. Willig (1981), "An Economic Definition of Predation:
Pricing and Product Innovation," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 91, pp. 8-53.
"Performance Tests: Compatibility "(1998), PC Magazine, April 7, 1998, at
http://www.zdnet.com/pcmag/features/java98/290327.html.
Reddy Bernard J., David S. Evans, and Albert L. Nichols (1999), "Why Does Microsoft
Charge So Little for Windows?," National Economic Research Associates working paper.
Reinganum, Jennifer (1989), "The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development, and
Diffusion" in The Handbook of Industrial Organization, R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds.),
Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing.
Salop, Steven and David Scheffman (1987), "Cost-Raising Strategies," Journal of
Industrial Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 19-34.
Schmalensee, Richard L. (1999) “Schmalensee Testimony,” available at 
www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/schmal/schmal.asp.
Segal Ilya R. and Michael D. Whinston (1998), "Exclusive Contracts and Protection of
Investments," unpublished manuscript, University of California at Berkeley.
___________ and _________________ (2000), "Naked Exclusion: Comment," American
Economic Review, forthcoming.
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, April 2, 1992 (revised April 8, 1997).37
U.S Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property, April 6, 1995.
U.S. v. Microsoft (1998), Civil Action No. 98-1232 (Antitrust), Complaint, U.S. District
Court For The District Of Columbia, May 18, 1998.
U.S. v. Microsoft (1999), Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ), Plaintiffs' Joint Proposed
Findings of Facts B Revised, U.S. District Court For The District of Columbia, September 10,
1999.
U.S. v. Microsoft (2000a), Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ), Plaintiffs' Revised Proposed
Final Judgment, U.S. District Court For The District of Columbia, April 26, 2000.
U.S. v. Microsoft (2000b), Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ), Court's Finding of Facts, U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, November 5, 1999.
U.S. v. Microsoft (2000c), Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ), Conclusions of Law, U.S.
District Court For The District of Columbia, April 3, 2000.
U.S. v. Microsoft (2000d), Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ), Final Judgment, U.S. District
Court For The District of Columbia, June 7, 2000.
U.S. v. Microsoft (2000e), Civil Action No. 98-1232 (TPJ), Remedies Brief of Amici
Curiae, April 27, 2000.
Whinston, Michael D. (1990) "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic
Review, Vol. 80, pp. 837-859.38
Endnotes
                        
1   See Gilbert (1998) for a discussion of the economic issues in the case.
2   Schmalensee's testimony in U.S. v. Microsoft, January 13, 1999, available at
<http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/schmal/III.asp>.
3   Fisher and Rubinfeld (2000, p. 13-14) also reject Schmalensee's elasticity calculation as
irrelevant to the determination of monopoly power: "Since Microsoft's marginal cost is
essentially zero, the short-run profit-maximizing action for the firm is to price at the point where
the elasticity of demand that it faces is unity.  That is true whether or not Microsoft has market
power." While correct, this observation does not refute Schmalensee's point.  A profit-
maximizing firm responds to its perceived, or firm-specific, demand elasticity.  In the presence of
competition, which Schmalensee asserts exists, inelastic market demand is consistent with elastic
firm-specific demand, and it is the latter that constrains prices.
4   Some authors have argued that America Online wanted an exclusive arrangement to distribute
a single browser to its customers and that Microsoft merely won the bidding to supply AOL (for
example, Cass and Hylton, 1999).  Moreover, Evans and Schmalensee (2000b) claim that AOL is
so large that this outcome alone is enough to explain Internet Explorer’s dominant market share. 
Even if these statements are accurate, they still do not explain Microsoft's conduct with respect to
other Internet and on-line service providers.
5   Direct testimony of Cameron Myhrvold in U.S. v. Microsoft,
<http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/mswitness/myhrvold/myhrvold.asp>.  Myhrvold was
a vice President at Microsoft responsible for business relationships with Internet service
providers.
6   Schmalensee pointed to Microsoft’s investment in the Windows feature that made it easy for a
user to establish an account with an on-line or Internet service provider.  (Schmalensee 1999, p.
226.)  However, this investment was not specific to any given service provider and thus exclusive
arrangements appear unnecessary to support such investment.
7   Although not predatory, a squeeze may lower welfare.  It can do so by allowing firm M to
appropriate the benefits of innovation undertaken by independent suppliers of B, thus reducing
their incentives to innovate.
8   These included November 27, 1996 and November 16, 1998 e-mails from A. Nehru detailing
Netscape's revenue sources, and a September 23, 1996 e-mail from B. Akerlind stating that
"Netscape can no longer make any money on the browser in the OEM market."
9   Trial transcript, U.S. v. Microsoft, November 9, 1999 (p.m. session), available at39
                                                                              
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/transcripts/nov98/11-09-pm.asp.
10   For an example of this argument, see testimony of Richard Schmalensee at U.S. v.  Microsoft,
Section III, available at <http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/schmal/III.asp>, at para. 149.
11   For movement of browser market shares from 1997 to 1998, see
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/exhibits/5.pdf. Statmarket claims that Internet Explorer's share of
browser usage in June 2000 was more than 86 percent (Scott Clark, “Browser Statistics Look
Good for IE,” June 27, 2000, http://www.internetnews.com/wd-
news/article/0,,10_403661,00.html).  Positive Support Review estimated IE's market share at
about 76 percent in July 2000, with Netscape at about 15 percent (see
http://www.psrinc.com/MSExplorer.htm).  BrowserWatch reported that 58.7 percent of the hits
on its website in July 2000 were from Internet surfers using Internet Explorer and 26.1 percent of
the hits were from surfers using Netscape Navigator, as reported at
http://browserwatch.internet.com/stats/stats.html.)
12   Many commenters have drawn comparisons between the proposed breakup of Microsoft and
the 1984 breakup of AT&T, but the proposals are actually quite different. The AT&T breakup
entailed line-of-business restrictions that kept the courts heavily involved in the workings of the
industry.